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Free-rider problem. In economics, the free-rider problem is a type of market failure that occurs when those who benefit from resources, public goods and common pool resources do not pay for them [ 1] or under-pay. Examples of such goods are public roads or public libraries or other services or utilities of a communal nature.
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups is a book by Mancur Olson Jr. published in 1965. It develops a theory of political science and economics of concentrated benefits versus diffuse costs. Its central argument is that concentrated minor interests will be overrepresented and diffuse majority interests trumped ...
The free rider problem is a primary issue in collective decision-making. [36] An example is that some firms in a particular industry will choose not to participate in a lobby whose purpose is to affect government policies that could benefit the industry, under the assumption that there are enough participants to result in a favourable outcome ...
Collective action problem. A collective action problem or social dilemma is a situation in which all individuals would be better off cooperating but fail to do so because of conflicting interests between individuals that discourage joint action. [ 1][ 2][ 3] The collective action problem has been addressed in political philosophy for centuries ...
Situations like this include the prisoner's dilemma, a collective action problem in which no communication is allowed, the free rider problem, and the tragedy of the commons, also known as the problem with open access. [12] An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is "belling the cat". [13]
These punishments effectively resolve tragedy of the commons scenarios by addressing both first-order free rider problems (i.e. defectors free riding on cooperators) and second-order free rider problems (i.e. cooperators free riding on work of punishers). [140] Such results can only be witnessed when the punishment levels are high enough.
The free-rider problem is often cited as the rationale for union security agreements. A classic study of the free rider problem is presented in Mancur Olson's 1965 work, The Logic of Collective Action. [2]
A public goods games variant suggested as an improvement for researching the free-rider problem is one in which endowment are earned as income. The standard game (with a fixed initial endowment) allows no work effort variation and cannot capture the marginal substitutions among three factors: private goods, public goods, and leisure. [18]